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Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character:
they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phe-
nomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content
that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track,
but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism
on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and
offer in their place a new theory: reflexive imperativism. Our proposal is that an
experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a
Command with reflexive imperative content (1), while an experience U feels un-
pleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflex-
ive imperative content (2):
(1) More of P!
(2) Less of U!
If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of
commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me!
1. Introduction
Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenom-
enal character: they feel good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant.
Imperativism says that we can explain affective phenomenal character
by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that
directs rather than describes. In this paper, we argue that imperativism
is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There
are two varieties of imperativism currently on the market: first-order
imperativism (Martı´nez 2011, 2015a, 2015b) and higher-order
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imperativism (Klein 2015). We shall show that neither is successful,
and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive imperativism.
Our proposal is that an experience has affective phenomenal char-
acter in virtue of possessing reflexive imperative content.1 More pre-
cisely, an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being (at least partly)
constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (1),
while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being (at least
partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content
(2):
(1) More of P!
(2) Less of U!
If you need a slogan: experiences feel pleasant or unpleasant in virtue
of commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me!2
Imperativism is one approach to affective phenomenal character.
Other prominent accounts include: evaluativism (Bain 2013;
Carruthers 2018; Cutter and Tye 2011; Tye 2005), psycho-functionalism
(Aydede forthcoming), and the desire theory (Brady forthcoming;
Heathwood 2007). We think that our proposal is not just the best
formulation of imperativism, but the best theory of affective phenom-
enal character altogether. But we shall restrict our arguments to the
former, more local claim. Still, we will show that reflexive imperati-
vism has remarkable explanatory power. For this reason, it should be
considered one of the most promising candidate accounts.
The paper is structured as follows. In §2, we further clarify our
explanandum: affective phenomenal character. In §3, we introduce
the common core of imperativism. After this, we illustrate the differ-
ent versions of imperativism and assess their respective merits. We
start in §4 with first-order imperativism, and argue that it won’t do. In
§5, we do the same with respect to higher-order imperativism. We
then present, in §6, our variety of imperativism about affective
1 The relation in-virtue-of will play a big role in this article. But we will avoid giving a
precise characterisation. We take it to express some relation of dependence/determination, on a
scale that goes from supervenience to identity. For our aims, it is unnecessary to pick a precise
point on the scale.
2 In English, there might be subtle differences in meaning among ‘More of me!’, ‘Get more
of me!’, ‘Have more of me!’, and so on. We doubt that the imperative content of affective
experiences is so fine-grained to express these differences, so we can safely ignore them. The
crucial point is simply this: an experience feels good/bad in virtue of commanding the subject
of the experience (or a cognitive sub-system of the subject) to get more/less of this very
experience, or something near enough. We thank the Editors of this journal for urging us
to clarify this.
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phenomenal character—reflexive imperativism—and show how it can
solve the difficulties that beset first-order and higher-order imperati-
vism. We conclude, in §7, by highlighting a further benefit of reflexive
imperativism: it paves the way to accounting for the evolutionary
function of affective phenomenal character and, by doing so, it illu-
minates the relations among affective phenomenal character, motiv-
ation, and learning.
2. The explanandum
Some mental states are such that there is something it is like for their
subjects to be in them. If your visual system is properly working and
you stare at a banana in good light, there is something it is like for you
to see that banana. Call these mental states ‘experiences’, and call what
it is like to have them their ‘phenomenal character’.
‘Affective experiences’ have ‘affective phenomenal character’: they
feel good (pleasant) or bad (unpleasant). An experience has positive
affective phenomenal character when it feels good, and negative af-
fective phenomenal character when it feels bad. It is controversial
exactly which experiences count as affective experiences, but here are
some paradigmatic examples: pain experiences3 (for example, head-
aches and cramps), pleasant and unpleasant bodily sensations
(for example, orgasms and intense itches), felt emotions (for ex-
ample, happiness and shame), and felt moods (for example, elation
and misery). Affective phenomenal character is our target
explanandum.
A theory of affective phenomenal character has to answer the fol-
lowing questions:
(Q1) In virtue of what does an experience have affective phenom-
enal character?
(Q2) In virtue of what does an experience have positive, rather than
negative, affective phenomenal character (or vice versa)?
To answer these questions, we adopt the well-known intentionalist
strategy, which attempts to explain phenomenal character by reference
to intentional content. (More on this in the next section.) Philosophers
working on consciousness are often puzzled by the following question:
3 Subjects suffering from pain asymbolia report that they experience pain, but that it does
not feel unpleasant (Berthier et al. 1990). Lacking affective phenomenal character, asymbolic
pain does not count as an affective experience. Does it count as pain at all? This question is
beyond the remit of this article.
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how is it possible that there is any such thing as phenomenal character?
This puzzlement involves the thought that phenomenal character is
radically different from anything else in the world. This leaves the
existence of phenomenal character in the natural world seeming mys-
terious. We think that the intentionalist strategy helps us to see how
phenomenal character is possible, for the following reason.
We often appeal to phenomenal character in providing psychological
explanations. We might ask: ‘Why do you think that fruit is a mandarin,
not a lime?’ And you might answer: ‘Because it looks orange!’ But you
might also explain this by talking solely of the intentional content of
your experience, without mentioning phenomenal character: ‘Because it
is orange’, you can say. So intentional content can play the same role in
psychological explanations as phenomenal character does.
This suggests that if we can work out how mental states can have
intentional content, it should become less mysterious how they can
have phenomenal character. Phenomenal character is not radically
different from everything else, but could rather be explained by—or
even identified with—intentional content. This is enticing for philoso-
phers searching for a naturalistic account of the mind. If phenomenal
character can be explained by appeal to intentional content, then we
‘only ’ need to naturalise the latter in order to naturalise the former.
Intentionalism thus paves the way to cracking the hard problem of
consciousness. This is why it has proven such an attractive position to
philosophers in the last three decades (Hellie 2009).
What is the distinctive role that affective phenomenal character
plays in psychological explanations? It explains motivations. ‘Why
don’t you want to feel pain any longer?’, we ask. ‘Because it feels
bad!’, you answer. Any theory of affective phenomenal character
must then explain its connection with motivation. But affective
phenomenal character does not just happen to be typically motivat-
ing; it has intrinsic motivational force (Bain 2013; Jacobson forth-
coming). Suppose that you are having a visual experience as of a red
apple. The visual phenomenal character of your experience can mo-
tivate you to reach out and grab the apple, but only if you have a
background desire for apples. Affective phenomenal character is
different: it can motivate you independently of any other conative
state. Once you have told us that your experience feels bad, you
have fully explained why you are motivated to get rid of it.4 (But
see Corns 2014.)
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There are things other than affective phenomenal character which
are intrinsically motivating. A desire can be intrinsically motivating
without being pleasant or unpleasant. Hunger is intrinsically motivat-
ing, but does not always feel bad (or good). What is special about
affective phenomenal character’s intrinsic motivational force is that it
is self-directed, or reflexive. Reflexive motivational force is a particular
form of mind-directed motivational force. It motivates us to do some-
thing about our own mental states. But it doesn’t just motivate us to
get into or out of some mental state or another. The mental state
which affective phenomenal character motivates us for or against is
the very same mental state that has affective phenomenal character.
When we are having a pleasant/unpleasant experience, it is the very
pleasant/unpleasant experience that we want/do not want to have: we
want to avoid pain, misery, shame, and unpleasant itches; we want
happiness, orgasms, and elation. Again, in explaining our motivations
for or against affective experiences, we need do no more than appeal
to their affective phenomenal character: why does misery motivate you
to have no more misery? Because it feels bad! Thus an adequate theory
of affective phenomenal character has to answer (Q3) as well:
(Q3) In virtue of what does affective phenomenal character have
intrinsic and reflexive motivational force?
3. Imperativism
We adopt the intentionalist strategy: we propose to explain affective
phenomenal character by appeal to intentional content. But while
standard, or ‘representationalist’, intentionalism attempts to explain
affective phenomenal character in terms of indicative content, we shall
4 ‘Intrinsic motivational force’ is a dispositional notion. Thus, strictly speaking, to say that
affective phenomenal character has intrinsic motivational force is to say that it has the capacity,
or the power, to motivate independently of any other conative state. This capacity might fail to
manifest itself. For example, your attention may be diverted from an unpleasant experience by
a sudden distraction. Furthermore, even when motivations are produced, this does not imply
that they are efficacious in bringing about intentional action. The subject might in fact have
stronger, countervailing motivations—like when a marathon runner endures her unpleasant
pain, because the thing she wants the most is to reach the finish line. Since none of our
arguments hinge upon intrinsic motivational force’s dispositional and pro tanto nature, we will
omit the qualification in what follows, so to keep things as simple as possible.
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instead resort to imperative content. Our theory is thus a form of
imperativism.
3.1 Indicative and imperative contents
Consider the following two sentences:
(3) Ben is closing the door;
(4) Ben, close the door!
Recent work in the philosophy of language and natural language se-
mantics suggests that an imperative sentence like (4) has a different
type of content from a declarative sentence like (3). (See Charlow 2014
and Portner 2016 for an overview.) (3) has indicative content, (4) has
imperative content.5 Here is a characterisation of the distinction:
Indicative Content:
(i) Has the function of carrying information, for example, that p is
the case;
(ii) Has truth conditions: it is true if p is the case and false if not;
(iii) The audience correctly uptakes it by forming a belief.
Imperative Content:
(iv) Has the function of directing its addressee to do something, for
example, to f;
(v) Has satisfaction conditions: it is satisfied if and only if the
addressee fs;
(vi) The addressee correctly uptakes it by forming a motivation.
The content of (3) carries the information that Ben is closing the door
and is true if and only if Ben is closing the door. The content of (4)
does not have an information-carrying function and cannot be eval-
uated as true or false. Rather, it has the function of directing Ben to
5 Why not stick with Frege’s idea that there is one type of content only, but different
illocutionary forces? For example, why not think that utterances (A) and (B) have the same
content, namely, that Ben will buy ice-cream tomorrow, but assertoric and directive force,
respectively?
A. Ben will buy ice-cream tomorrow;
B. Buy ice-cream tomorrow! (said to Ben)
The issue is complex and we cannot do it justice in this article. For discussion, see Hanks
(2007). In any case, we suspect that Fregeans will be able to accept much of our substantive
view by formulating their own style of imperativist theory. We thank the Editors of Mind for
pointing out this possibility to us.
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close the door and is satisfied if and only if Ben does so. If Ben is
receptive to the speaker, he will uptake the content of (3) by forming a
belief, and uptake the content of (4) by forming a motivation.6
The distinction between indicative and imperative content is also
relevant for the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. (Shea 2013
is a good place to start.) Some mental states have indicative content.
(Call these states ‘Indicators’.) Other mental states have imperative
content. (Call them ‘Commands’.) This distinction, we maintain,
paves the way to account for the difference between affective phenom-
enal character and other types of phenomenal character.
3.2 Imperativism about affective phenomenal character
Mary is having a visual experience as of a red tomato. Intentionalists
want to explain the phenomenal character of Mary ’s experience by
reference to intentional content. Some say the relevant content is first-
order content (5) (Dretske 1995; Tye 1995). Others point to higher-
order content (6) (Rosenthal 2005):
(5) There is a red tomato;
(6) I am having a visual experience as of a red tomato.
Both (5) and (6) are indicative contents. In spite of the countless
divergences among them, until recently all intentionalists assumed
that indicative content was the only type of content to be invoked
in an explanation of phenomenal character.
Imperativism marks a reaction against this stricture. Imperativists
maintain that imperative content is a central explanatory tool too.
Perhaps indicative content suffices to explain certain types of phenomenal
character (for example, visual phenomenal character). But there are other
types of phenomenal character that are bound to resist a ‘purely indica-
tivist’ treatment. This is the central tenet of imperativism.
6 According to this picture, the features possessed by each type of content are deeply
intertwined. Take imperative content. Its function is that of directing its addressee to f.
This is why it is satisfied only if the addressee fs. But for the addressee to f, the addressee
needs to be motivated to f. Therefore, the correct, or successful, uptake of an imperative
content cannot simply involve the addressee forming the belief I am commanded to . It also
requires that the addressee forms the motivation to f. This understanding of imperative
content is somewhat controversial. Some accounts distinguish between uptake and accept-
ance—I uptake the imperative content by understanding that I am being told to f, and I
accept it by forming the motivation to f. But that more complex model is equally congenial
for our purposes—the function of the imperative content is to get the addressee (say, Ben) to
f, and if Ben is receptive to the speaker, he will both uptake the imperative content by
understanding he is being told to f and accept it by forming a motivation to f.
Mind, Vol. 0 . 0 . May 2019  Barlassina and Hayward 2019
More of me! Less of me! 7
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
ind/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/m
ind/fzz035/5529348 by U
niversity of Sheffield user on 13 July 2019
Imperative content was first used to explain the sensory phenomenal
character of bodily sensations like itches (Hall 2008) and pains (Klein
2007). Subsequently, it was deployed to deal with pain experiences’
affective phenomenal character (Martı´nez 2011). Finally, it has been
applied to affective phenomenal character in general (Martı´nez 2015a;
Klein 2015). This article belongs to the latter project. It is easy to grasp
the intuitive motivation to account for affective phenomenal character
through imperative content. You can explain coming to believe that
there is a red apple on the table by appealing to the visual phenomenal
character of your experience. Why did you believe this? Because that’s
how it looked! This explanation makes sense if visual phenomenal
character depends on indicative content—forming that belief was in
fact the condition of correctly uptaking this type of content. But visual
phenomenal character is motivationally inert, unlike, for example, the
affective phenomenal character of a toothache. Imperativism proposes
that affective phenomenal character depends on imperative content.
Forming a motivation is the condition of correctly uptaking this type
of content. Imperative content thus has intrinsic motivational force—
its function is to direct, not to describe. Therefore, we begin to
understand why affective phenomenal character has this motivational
force too.
We begin to understand. We are not suggesting that what we
have just told you counts as an explanation of affective phenomenal
character. For while all imperativist theories correctly appeal to the
intrinsically motivational nature of imperative content, the extant
theories do not, we claim, successfully explain affective phenomenal
character.
4. First-order imperativism
4.1 The theory introduced
The central tenet of first-order imperativism (Martı´nez 2011, 2015a,
2015b) can be expressed as follows:
First-order imperativism: an experience has affective phenomenal
character in virtue of having first-order imperative content.
The content of a mental state is a first-order content if and only if it
does not feature any mental state. Accordingly, the content of a mental
state is a first-order imperative content if and only if it directs the
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subject to do something about the non-mental world only.7 It is in
virtue of having this type of imperative content that an experience has
affective phenomenal character—Martı´nez says.
George is feeling pain because his right hand is under scalding water.
George’s experience has sensory phenomenal character (George experi-
ences certain sensory qualities as instantiated in his hand) and affective
phenomenal character (George’s experience is unpleasant). Martı´nez
proposes that George’s experience has sensory phenomenal character
in virtue of having first-order indicative content:
(7) There is a burning disturbance in your right hand.
On the other hand, his experience possesses affective phenomenal
character in virtue of having first-order imperative content:
(8) See to it that the disturbance in your right hand does not exist!
Thus George’s pain experience is a compound mental state, made up
of an Indicator conjoined with a Command—the content of the first
determining the burning sensation, the content of the second deter-
mining the feeling of unpleasantness.
What about affective phenomenal character’s intrinsic motivational
force? Imperative contents have intrinsic motivational force, in that
they direct their addressees to do something. Therefore, if the affective
phenomenal character of George’s experience depends on content (8),
it is not hard to see why it has intrinsically motivational force.
First-order imperativism is an elegant and simple theory. These
virtues, however, come at a high price: the theory is false. So, at
least, we argue in the next section.
4.2 Four problems
4.2.1 First-order imperative content without affective phenomenal
character Imperativism was first introduced as an explanation of the
sensory phenomenal character of bodily sensations like itches and
hunger (Hall 2008). These experiences can motivate one to scratch
or eat in the absence of any other conative state. Thus we agree that it
is plausible to think that they have first-order imperative content. An
itch commands Scratch! while hunger says Eat! But here is the rub:
itches don’t always feel bad, nor does hunger. And when these experi-
ences don’t feel bad, they don’t necessarily feel good either.
7 By the same token, a first-order indicative content is a content that represents the non-
mental world only.
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Sometimes, they feel neither good nor bad. That’s to say, sometimes
they have no affective phenomenal character. But these experiences
have intrinsic, world-directed motivational force, and thus have first-
order imperative content, nonetheless. So, pace Martı´nez, first-order
imperative content is not sufficient for affective phenomenal character.
4.2.2 Affective phenomenal character without first-order imperative
content Alice has been suffering from depression. Today, she is feeling
miserable. Her experience has negative affective phenomenal character—
if there is an unpleasant mood, misery is one. But it does not seem to
have any first-order imperative content, since it elicits no world-directed
motivations. Alice, like many who suffer from depression, spent the
entire day in bed, completely still. To be sure, she wanted not to feel
miserable, but she didn’t want to do anything else. But if an experience
can have affective phenomenal character without having first-order im-
perative content, then the former does not obtain in virtue of the latter.
Martı´nez could reply as follows. It is true that, when feeling miser-
able, one ends up doing nothing. But this is because misery has first-
order imperative content:
(9) Don’t do anything!
In other words, misery does have world-directed motivational force. It
is just that this force is negative: it motivates one not to act upon the
non-mental world.
This reply is not very convincing. We do not know of any model of
misery/depression according to which this condition is due to the
presence of a global, negative, world-directed motivational signal. In
fact, the consensus is that misery/depression concerns a global loss of
world-directed motivation. When one feels miserable, one does not
experience one’s ordinary urges together with the stronger urge not to
act upon the non-mental world. Rather, one feels as if one’s world-
directed urges have disappeared.
Misery is another counter-example to first-order imperativism: an
experience with affective phenomenal character, but lacking any first-
order imperative content. First-order imperative content is not neces-
sary for affective phenomenal character either.
4.2.3 Positives and negatives Martı´nez offers no explicit answer to
why an experience feels good rather than bad (or vice versa). But it
is possible to reconstruct what he has in mind from the examples
he considers. He suggests that the negative affective phenomenal
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character of fear and disgust depend on imperative contents like (10)
and (11):
Fear: (10) Stay away from that danger!
Disgust: (11) Stay away from those pathogens!
And he proposes that the positive affective phenomenal character of an
orgasm or of tasting chocolate depends on imperative contents such as:
Orgasm: (12) Get more stimulation of the genitals!
Taste: (13) Get more chocolate!
Hence, it seems fair to say that, according to Martı´nez:
. An experience has negative affective phenomenal character in
virtue of having first-order aversive imperative content (an im-
perative content that directs its addressee to stay clear from, or
to avoid, or to get less of, something in the non-mental world).
. An experience has positive affective phenomenal character in
virtue of having first-order appetitive imperative content (an
imperative content that directs its addressee to approach, or to
get more of, something in the non-mental world).
This proposal does not strike us as tenable. Consider agonising
hunger. It has first-order appetitive imperative content: Eat something!
or Put something in your stomach! But it is unpleasant. Martı´nez might
respond that agonising hunger has in fact first-order aversive imperative
content: Stop having an empty stomach! But such a move highlights
another problem: there does not seem to be a principled distinction
between appetitive and aversive first-order imperative contents. What is
the difference between Stop having an empty stomach! and Put something
in your stomach!? The choice of whether to characterise such contents as
appetitive or as aversive is arbitrary. But whether or not an experience is
pleasant or unpleasant is not arbitrary. Martı´nez is in trouble again.
4.2.4 Reflexive and intrinsic motivational force Try to remember the
last time you had an excruciating pain. The unpleasantness of your
pain motivated you to get rid of the pain, didn’t it? We bet that you
did all sorts of things to silence your pain experience: you took pain-
killers, directed your attention elsewhere, and even smoked all Bob’s
marijuana. This is why we said that affective phenomenal character
is intrinsically and reflexively motivational: all by itself, the affective
phenomenal character of an experience E motivates us for or against
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E. This is not something that Martı´nez can explain. If the unpleasant-
ness of a toothache depends on the first-order imperative content:
(14) See to it that the cavity in your tooth does not exist!
then it will motivate you to get rid of the cavity in your tooth. But it’s
unclear why it would motivate you to stop feeling pain.
How could Martı´nez respond? He could accept that affective phe-
nomenal character is typically associated with reflexive motivational
force, but deny that such force is intrinsic to it. It is only in virtue
of other, background desires that we are motivated to have more or
get rid of affective experiences. This, in effect, is exactly what Martı´nez
says about pain:
No pain … is directing us to do something about itself. … Let’s assume that
[Iris’s toothache] has being going on for hours. … Iris has already made an
appointment with a dentist early the next morning. There is nothing more
she can do now to follow the toothache command. In such a situation, the
toothache … is just spam. If Iris is able to limit the impact of such
unhelpful advice …, she should do so. (Martı´nez 2015b, pp. 2269-70,
emphases added)
Martı´nez would have us believe that there is no constitutive connec-
tion between the unpleasantness of pain and Iris’s motivation to get
rid of it. Rather, unpleasantness motivates Iris to do something other
than get rid of her pain—in this case, to call the doctor. It is only
accidentally that Iris wants to get rid of the pain—because there is no
further action she can take to improve her bodily state, and the human
mind has the general tendency to avoid ‘insistent and unfulfillable
requests’ (Martı´nez 2015b, p. 2270). This theory predicts that any
action Iris takes to get rid of the pain (for example, taking a painkiller,
or trying to distract herself ) would only arise after she has realised that
there is nothing further she can do to fix her cavity.
We are not persuaded. We may be atypical, but when we experience
pain, our first motivation is to get rid of the pain. And we are moti-
vated to do that not because pain is giving us some other motivation
that we cannot currently act on, but simply because pain feels un-
pleasant. In fact, very often we only take steps to protect our bodies
because these seem like the best way to avoid pain—perhaps irrespon-
sibly, it’s only when the toothache is persistent that we tend to call the
dentist. This indicates that when we are motivated for or against af-
fective experiences, our motivation is intrinsic to them, not extrinsic.
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4.3 Taking stock
Something went badly wrong with Martı´nez’s first-order imperativism.
What exactly? One might say that the problem lies with imperative con-
tents. But this cannot be right, since the same kind of issue arises for any
first-order account of affective phenomenal character. Consider evaluati-
vism (Bain 2013; Cutter and Tye 2011). The idea here is that an experience
has affective phenomenal character in virtue of having first-order evalu-
ative content—that is, in virtue of representing a certain worldly object as
good or as bad (evaluative contents are thus indicative, rather than im-
perative). For example, Joe’s back pain is said to be unpleasant in virtue of
representing a certain bodily damage in Joe’s back as bad (for Joe).
Assuming that such first-order content has intrinsic motivational force
at all, it appears only to motivate Joe to take care of his body, and
hence fails to explain the fact that the unpleasantness of Joe’s experience
motivates him to get rid of his very experience.8 By the same token, first-
order evaluative contents are also ill-suited to explain the negative affective
phenomenal character possessed by misery: what is the first-order target
that an experience of misery evaluates as bad? Nothing comes to mind.
Accordingly, the problem with the contents chosen by Martı´nez is
not that they are imperative. It is that they are first-order.
Imperativists should resort to a type of imperative content that
rather directs one to do something about one’s mental states. The
natural way to implement such a suggestion is to go higher-order.
This is exactly what Colin Klein (2015) did. Let us then see whether
higher-order imperativism fares better than first-order imperativism.
5. Higher-order imperativism
Let’s say that the content C of a mental state M is a higher-order
content if and only if C features some mental state M* different
from M. For example, Mary ’s belief that she likes ice-cream has
higher-order (indicative) content:
(15) I like ice-cream.
Mutatis mutandis, the content C of a mental state M of a subject S is a
higher-order imperative content if and only if C directs S to do some-
thing about some mental state M* different from M.
8 To be fair, evaluativists are aware of this problem and have tried to deal with it on
multiple occasions (Bain 2013, 2019; Cutter and Tye 2014). We are not convinced by their
responses, but we leave this to another paper.
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The general idea behind higher-order imperativism is that affective
phenomenal character depends on higher-order imperative content.
Here is how Klein puts it:
Pleasantness [and unpleasantness] are higher-order mental states.
[Unpleasantness] is an attitude taken towards pain. That attitude could
also be taken towards a variety of other sensations. Hence, it is possible to
be [unpleasantly] hungry, tired, or lonely. That makes [unpleasantness] a
higher-order mental state: … a state that is … directed towards some other
mental state. … It is a second-order imperative directed towards a first-
order sensation. (Klein 2015, 183-6, emphasis added)9
On Klein’s view, there are two distinct states: one that commands the
subject to get less/more of the other. There are two ways of interpret-
ing this proposal, each corresponding to different answers to the ques-
tion ‘which of the two states is the one that feels bad/good?’ Under
either interpretation, higher-order imperativism does a better job in
accounting for affective phenomenal character than first-order imper-
ativism. However, both versions face serious difficulties.
5.1 Higher-order imperativism: first formulation
Here is the most straightforward reading of the central claim made by
higher-order imperativism:
(HO1): An experience E of a subject S has affective phenomenal char-
acter in virtue of having higher-order imperative content directing S
to do something about some of S’s mental states distinct from E.
On this view, affective experiences have higher-order imperative content.
It is in virtue of this content that they feel pleasant or unpleasant. More
precisely, an unpleasant experience U is a higher-order Command with
higher-order imperative content (16), while a pleasant experience P is a
higher-order Command with higher-order imperative content (17):
(16) Less of M!
(17) More of M!
where ‘M’ picks a mental state different from U and P.
Remember George, who is feeling an unpleasant pain because his
right hand is under scalding water? According to (HO1), George is in
fact having two numerically distinct experiences at the same time:
9 Note that Klein is using the term ‘attitude’ simply as a catch-all for various kinds of
higher-order intentional states. As he explains, the particular kind of attitude he has in mind is
a higher-order imperative—a higher-order Command, in our terminology.
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(i) A sensory experience S (that is, pain), which has sensory
phenomenal character, but lacks affective phenomenal
character;
(ii) An affective experience U, which has negative affective phe-
nomenal character, but lacks sensory phenomenal character.
For (HO1), U has negative affective phenomenal character in virtue
of possessing higher-order imperative content:
(18) Less of S!
In other words, it is not the pain that feels bad. It is the distinct
experience that tells us not to have pain that feels bad.
Analogously, a pleasant gustatory experience consists in the co-oc-
currence of two separate experiences: a first-order gustatory experience
G, which has sensory phenomenal character, but lacks affective phe-
nomenal character; and a higher-order experience P, possessing affect-
ive phenomenal character, but devoid of any sensory phenomenal
character. P has positive affective phenomenal character in virtue of
having higher-order imperative content:
(19) More of G!
Again, it is not the gustatory experience that feels good, but the dis-
tinct experience that tells us to have more of the gustatory experience.
5.2 The good and the bad of (HO1)
(HO1) has some advantages over first-order imperativism. First, it
fares better taxonomically. It needn’t count as having affective phe-
nomenal character experiences which are neither pleasant nor un-
pleasant, like mild hunger or minor itches. (HO1) can allow that
these experiences are first-order Commands (they have first-order
imperative contents like Eat something! and Scratch there!), and
simply deny that they have higher-order imperative content. Second,
it is not saddled with trying to find a world-directed motivation to
associate with misery. Misery consists in the co-occurrence of two
experiences: a first-order experience, S, and a higher-order one, H. S
does not have imperative content at all. H does, but it is higher-order
imperative content Less of S! This is why misery does not have world-
directed motivational force.
Apparently, (HO1) possesses a further virtue. Affective phenomenal
character has intrinsic, mind-directed motivational force: it motivates
us for or against our own mental states. (HO1) makes it clear why this
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is the case—after all, imperative contents are intrinsically motivational,
and higher-order contents are mind-directed by definition. The problem
for (HO1) is that it misidentifies which state it is that we are motivated
to get less of (or more of ). Suppose that you are having an unpleasant
pain experience. How does (HO1) describe this case? It says that you are
having two distinct experiences: an affectively neutral, sensory experi-
ence, S, and an unpleasant affective experience, U. The latter is unpleas-
ant in virtue of having higher-order imperative content:
(18) Less of S!
It is true that (18) has mind-directed motivational force, but it mo-
tivates you to get rid of experience S, which is not unpleasant at all!
This is clearly absurd. It is unpleasant states themselves (in this case U)
that we wish to be rid of, pleasant states themselves that we are moti-
vated to get. This is why we have said that the affective phenomenal
character of an experience E has a particular type of mind-directed
motivational force, namely, reflexive motivational force. It motivates
us for or against E itself. (HO1) cannot account for this.
5.3 Higher-order imperativism: second formulation
(HO1) is the most natural way to read Klein’s view. But, faced with the
argument above, Klein might argue that a revision is needed:
(HO2): An experience E of a subject S has affective phenomenal
character in virtue of being targeted by a mental state H (distinct
from E) whose higher-order imperative content directs S to do
something about E.
As does (HO1), (HO2) proposes that affective phenomenal character
has to do with the co-occurrence of two numerically distinct mental
states, E and H, where the latter is a higher-order Command directing
its subject to do something about E. The crucial difference is that while
(HO1) proposes that it is H that has affective phenomenal character,
(HO2) maintains that it is E that has it. Higher-order Commands do
not have affective phenomenal character; rather, they confer it on the
states that they target. On this view, an unpleasant experience E is an
experience targeted by a Command with higher-order imperative con-
tent (20), while a pleasant experience E* is an experience targeted by a
Command with higher-order imperative content (21):
(20) Less of E!
(21) More of E*!
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Take this case. Louise is feeling her right index finger touching a piece
of wood. Let’s call this sensation ‘S’. S does not have any affective
phenomenal character. What would it take for S to be pleasant or
unpleasant? According to (HO2), S should be targeted by another
mental state, call it ‘H’, with higher-order imperative content. If H’s
content is More of S! then S will feel good; if it is Less of S! then S will
feel bad.
(HO1) explained how affective phenomenal character has intrinsic,
mind-directed motivational force. But it mischaracterised the object of
that motivation, or, which comes to the same thing, failed to account
for its reflexivity. (HO2) fares better in this respect. If the affective
phenomenal character of an experience E depends on a higher-order
Command that says More of E!/Less of E! then it is E itself that E’s
affective phenomenal character motivates us to have/not to have.
Nevertheless, we have two misgivings about (HO2).
5.3.1 The good, the bad, and the neutral Mental states with imperative
content are often referred to in folk psychology as urges. For example,
the urges to scratch, defecate or eat seem to be aptly described as states
with first-order imperative content. But we also have urges to feel/not
feel experiences—as when a smoker has a strong urge to feel the sen-
sation of smoke rushing down her throat. These experiential urges are
best understood as higher-order Commands directing us to have more
or less of a certain experience. Accordingly, (HO2) predicts that if you
are having the experiential urge to feel a sensation while you are in fact
feeling it, the sensation will be pleasurable. Unfortunately for (HO2), it
is very easy to disconfirm this prediction.
As any smoker knows, the following situation often happens. You
are feeling the sensation of smoke hitting the back of your throat—call
this sensation ‘S’. At exactly the time you are having S, you have the
urge to feel S (that is, you are tokening a Command with higher-order
imperative content More of S!). Still, S fails to be pleasurable. It might
be entirely neutral. It might even be unpleasant. Either way, (HO2)
runs into trouble.
This should not come as a surprise. (HO2) is, after all, rather like the
desire theory (Heathwood 2007). Desire theorists say that a sensation
is pleasant if it is targeted by the intrinsic desire to have it, and it is
unpleasant if it is targeted by the intrinsic desire not to have it. But this
cannot be right. A celibate ascetic may feel sexual arousal arising un-
bidden, and desire it to end. The ascetic’s desire is an instantiation of
his deontic commitment to renounce the pleasures of the flesh, and so
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is paradigmatically intrinsic.10 Perhaps the ascetic will feel some other
unpleasant emotion of guilt or shame as a result. But the sensation of
arousal itself may still be thoroughly pleasant. (HO2) differs from the
desire theory in positing a higher-order urge in place of a higher-order
desire. Still, the difficulty that they face is the same. One can have an
urge or desire not to have an experience which is, in fact, thoroughly
pleasant.
5.3.2 Pure affect According to (HO2), it is lower-order experiences
that have affective phenomenal character. In the case of pain, a
first-order sensory experience becomes unpleasant in virtue of being
targeted by a higher-order Command. But it is not clear that we can
always characterise affective experiences in terms of an independent
lower-order experience. What is the lower-order experience in the case
of misery and depression that gets targeted by a higher-order
Command? We’re tempted to say—nothing at all. True enough,
when one feels depressed, often all sorts of experiences become un-
pleasant. But depression and misery are also often experienced as a
feeling of pure unpleasantness—some patients call it a ‘black feeling’.
They feel bad. And that’s all there is to them.
You may disagree with our portrayal of depression and misery.
There is, nevertheless, good empirical evidence that pure affect
occurs. The most famous case is probably the one described in
Ploner et al. (1999):
A 57 year-old male … suffered from a stroke … [resulting in] a le-
s ion … compris ing pr imary and secondary somatosensory
cortices. … Thermonociceptive stimuli were applied by means of cutane-
ous laser stimulation. Pain thresholds were 200 mJ for right hand. Evoked
pain sensations were characterized as ‘pinprick-like’ and were well
localized. For left hand, up to an intensity of 600 mJ, no pain sensation
10 Heathwood might reject the claim that this is an intrinsic desire. But this is because
Heathwood has a rather idiosyncratic account of intrinsicality. While the standard view has it
that intrinsic desires are ‘desires … for states of affairs that are wanted for themselves’
(Schroeder 2017, section 2.2), Heathwood says that there must be ‘no reason you can give
for wanting’ (Heathwood 2007, p. 30, emphasis added) whatever you desire intrinsically—even
if that reason points to an intrinsic property of the thing desired. He adds (ibid., p. 30,
footnote 13) that if one desires something because it exemplifies a broader class that one has
desires towards, then that desire counts as extrinsic. This leads him to the incredible conclu-
sion that if we desire some sensation ‘because it is pleasant’ (ibid., p. 38), that would be a case
of extrinsic desire! Clearly Heathwood’s account should be rejected. In any case, Heathwood’s
response can hardly help the higher-order imperative theorist—urges are never had for a
reason, and so would always count as intrinsic for him. But it is possible to have an urge
not to have a state and still not find that state unpleasant.
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could be elicited. However, at intensities of 350 mJ and more, the patient
spontaneously described a ‘clearly unpleasant’ intensity … that he wanted
to avoid. The patient … was completely unable to describe quality,
localization and intensity of the stimulus. Suggestions from a word list
containing ‘warm’, ‘hot’, ‘cold’, ‘touch’, ‘burning’, ‘pinprick-like’, ‘slight
pain’, ‘moderate pain’, and ‘intense pain’ were denied. Our results
demonstrate … loss of pain sensation with preserved pain affect. (Ploner
et al. 1999, pp. 212-13)
The patient reported the occurrence of an experience with negative
affective phenomenal character. However, no sensory phenomenal
character whatsoever was reported. This is thus a case of pure affect,
of an affective experience occurring in the absence of any lower-order
sensory experience. (HO2) cannot deal with a case like this.
Wait a second! Klein might reply that even though no lower-order
experience obtained here, the patient tokened some lower-order state
nonetheless—an unconscious somatosensory state. This strikes us as
ad hoc and implausible. There is no behavioural evidence in support of
this hypothesis. Even worse, there is neural evidence against it: the
patient’s somatosensory cortex is severely damaged, so we should
expect that he cannot token any somatosensory state, either conscious
or unconscious. We conclude that (HO2) fails to capture the phenom-
enon of pure affect and is thus inadequate.
5.4 Taking stock
Higher-order imperativism fails. However, it does a better job than
first-order imperativism in accounting for affective phenomenal char-
acter. This suggests that there is something to the idea that affective
phenomenal character should be accounted for in terms of imperative
contents directing their addressees to do something about their own
mental states. Klein cashed out this idea in terms of higher-order
imperative contents. Our proposal is instead that affective phenom-
enal character has to be explained in terms of reflexive imperative
content.
6. Reflexive imperativism
6.1 The theory introduced
Intentional states have objects. Indicative states represent their objects
as being a certain way. Imperative states direct their subjects to do
something about their objects. First-order intentional states have non-
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mental objects, and higher-order intentional states have mental ob-
jects which are distinct from those self-same states. This taxonomy
leaves space for another kind of intentional state: intentional states
whose objects are (at least in part) themselves—we can call these
‘reflexive’, or ‘same-order’ (Kriegel 2006), states.
The intuitive idea is this. A reflexive Indicator represents itself; a
reflexive Command directs us to do something about itself. But the
intuitive idea only gets you so far. Here is a more precise formulation
of the notion of reflexive Command (given our aims, we do not need
to dwell on reflexive Indicators): a reflexive Command K is a mental
state with reflexive imperative content, a content directing its ad-
dressee to do something about the mental state M of which K is a
constitutive part. Since everything is a part of itself, it goes without
saying that if M has no constituent other than K (that is, if M = K),
then K’s reflexive imperative content will direct its addressee to do
something about K itself only.
Reflexive imperative content, we maintain, allows the imperativist
to adequately explain affective phenomenal character. Our proposal is
as follows:
Reflexive imperativism: An experience E of a subject S has affective
phenomenal character in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted
by a Command K with reflexive imperative content (that is, a con-
tent directing S to do something about the mental state of which K
is a constitutive part—thus, about E).
In particular, an experience P is pleasant in virtue of being (at least
partly) constituted by a Command K+ with reflexive imperative content
(22), and an experience U is unpleasant in virtue of being (at least partly)
constituted by a Command K- with reflexive imperative content (23):
(22) More of the experience of which K+ is a constitutive part! (that
is, (1) More of P!)
(23) Less of the experience of which K– is a constitutive part! (that
is, (2) Less of U!)
In a nutshell, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of com-
manding us: More/less of me!
After all these pages, George still has his right hand under scalding
water and is feeling an unpleasant pain because of this. According to
higher-order imperativism, George is having two numerically distinct
mental states at the same time: a first-order sensory experience, S,
accompanied by a higher-order Command targeting S. Our proposal
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is instead that George is having one compound experience—call this
experience ‘U’. One of U’s constituents is an Indicator F with first-
order indicative content:11
(7) There is a burning disturbance in your right hand.
But U has another constitutive part, namely Command K-, with
reflexive imperative content (23):
(23) Less of the experience of which K- is a constitutive part! (that is,
(2) Less of U!)
Thus George’s experience (namely, U) is a compound mental state
made up of a first-order Indicator F conjoined with a reflexive
Command K- (that is U = F + K-). The sensory phenomenal character
of U depends on F’s indicative content (7), while U’s affective phenom-
enal character is determined by K-’s reflexive imperative content (23).
The points above apply to pleasant experiences. What is it to have a
pleasant bodily sensation in the neck (call it ‘P’)? It is to instantiate a
compound experience made up of a first-order indicator with indica-
tive content (24) conjoined to a Command K+ with reflexive impera-
tive content (22):
(24) Your neck is in such and such a condition;
(22) More of the experience of which K+ is a constitutive part! (that is,
(1) More of P!)
(24) determines P’s sensory phenomenal character, while (22) deter-
mines its affective phenomenal character.
Now that you have an idea of what reflexive imperativism is, we can
move to a more pressing question: why should you believe it? Well, to
begin with, it solves all the difficulties faced by first-order and higher-
order imperativism.12
11 We are open to the option that F might be a first-order Command. It might even be a
compound state in itself, made up of a first-order Indicator plus a first-order Command.
12 One might say that it is incorrect to characterise reflexive, or same-order, imperativism
as an alternative to higher-order imperativism. What we call ‘reflexive imperative contents’ are
in fact higher-order contents: they direct one to do something about one’s own mental states.
Hence, it would be more appropriate to conceive of our proposal as a version of higher-order
imperativism, and label it, say, ‘reflexive higher-order imperativism’. The point is moot. If it is
true that one can see same-order theories as variants of higher-order ones, it is also true that
everybody agrees that there is an important distinction between them: standard higher-order
theories posit two distinct mental states, one targeting the other; reflexive theories instead
maintain that there is one mental state targeting itself (Kriegel 2006). As we show in §6.2,
this apparently small distinction makes a huge explanatory difference.
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6.2 Problem solving
Reflexive imperativism has the capacity to provide the right taxonomy
of affective experiences. Like higher-order imperativism, it needn’t
suppose that all experiences with first-order imperative content—
like mild hunger or slight itches—have affective phenomenal charac-
ter. These first-order Commands simply are not conjoined with reflex-
ive Commands. Also, like higher-order imperativism, reflexive
imperativism allows that any kind of experience could, in principle,
have affective phenomenal character. Since all it takes for an experi-
ence to have affective phenomenal character is for the experience to be
(at least partly) constituted by a reflexive Command, the theory has
the ability to accommodate as extensive an array of affective experi-
ences as you please.
Unlike higher-order imperativism, reflexive imperativism does a
good job of explaining pure affect cases. Normally, a pain experience
is a conjunction of a first-order sensory experience and a reflexive
Command. These constituents can doubly dissociate. In pain asym-
bolia, the reflexive Command is missing. This is why asymbolic ‘pain’
has sensory phenomenal character, but not affective phenomenal char-
acter (Berthier et al. 1990). In the case of Ploner et al.’s patient, it is the
other constituent that is missing: the patient’s experience has no con-
stituent other than a reflexive Command. Such an experience says
nothing more than Get less of me! This is why it has affective phe-
nomenal character only. Analogously, if we think that certain forms of
misery and depression have no phenomenal character beyond feeling
awful, this allows us to account for them too.
Reflexive imperativism also manages to deal with a phenomenon
which we have not as yet dwelt upon. In one sense, all pleasant ex-
periences have something in common, something diametrically
opposed to the common feature of all unpleasant experiences: we
describe them as having a common phenomenology when we say
that they feel good, or feel pleasant. At same time, pleasant experiences
are diverse, heterogeneous. Heathwood captures the latter point
nicely: ‘[P]leasure is a diverse phenomenon. There are bodily pleas-
ures, like those had from sunbathing or from sexual activities. There
are gustatory pleasures, etc. … There doesn’t seem to be any one feel-
ing common to all occasions on which we experience pleasure’ (2007,
p. 25). Our theory captures both these commonalities and differences.
Much as all pleasant experiences are partly constituted by a ‘positive’
reflexive Command, they can differ in terms of their other constitu-
ents. It is in virtue of their shared reflexive Command that orgasms,
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happiness, and elation all count as pleasant experiences.13 And it is in
virtue of the differences in the states which are conjoined to the
Command that these experiences are so different. Thus, pleasure
may be mental or sensational, simple or complex, precisely located
or diffuse, informative or purely affective. The same applies to un-
pleasant experiences.14
Finally, reflexive imperativism explains why affective phenomenal
character has intrinsic and reflexive motivational force: it explains why
the affective phenomenal character of an experience E motivates us, all
by itself, to have more/less of E. Consider an unpleasant experience U.
Its unpleasantness depends on U’s content Less of U! This content,
being imperative, has intrinsic motivational force. Thus we do not
need to appeal to any other mental state to explain the motivational
force of U’s unpleasantness. Moreover, this content is reflexive: it
commands us to get less of U itself. This is why U’s unpleasantness
has reflexive motivational force.
13 Margot says: ‘I am French’; Charlotte says: ‘I am French’. Have they said the same thing?
Yes, each of them has said of herself that she is French … and no—Margot has said that
Margot is French; Charlotte has said that Charlotte is French. Something similar applies to
reflexive Commands. Token experience E1 has token Command K+1 as constituent, while
token experience E2 has Command K+2. In a sense, these two Commands ‘say ’ something
different: K+1 has imperative content More of E1!; K+2 has imperative content More of E2! In
another sense, these two Commands issue the same order: they both direct their addressees to
produce more of the token experience of which they are a constitutive part. This is what is
common to all ‘positive’ reflexive Commands and, according to us, what explains the phe-
nomenological commonalities among all pleasant experiences.
14 Some will be outraged. How could we say with a straight face that the only phenomenal
difference between, say, an orgasm and tasting white wine consists in the different non-affective
qualities making up the phenomenal character of these two experiences? Isn’t it obvious that,
in addition to those differences, it is also the case that an orgasm and tasting white wine feel
pleasant in a different way, and thus differ with regard to their affective phenomenal character?
As a matter of fact, it is not obvious at all. In fact, this strong claim about affective hetero-
geneity boils down to an un-argued intuition. By contrast, there are at least three good reasons
to maintain that (un)pleasantness is phenomenally homogenous.
First, the neural correlates of (un)pleasantness are the same irrespective of the type of
affective experience (Berridge and Kringelbach 2015; Leknes and Tracey 2008).
Second, we often take decisions (‘Should I go for A or for B?’) based on calculating which
outcome will give us the greatest pleasure/the least dis-pleasure (Gilbert and Wilson 2005). For
this calculation to be possible, the pleasantness/unpleasantness of different experiences has to
be commensurable. As it is sometime put, there should be a common currency circulating in our
affective life (Levy and Glimcher 2012). This is explained by hypothesizing that affective ex-
periences feel (un)pleasant in the same way.
Third, when we try to describe the difference between diverse (un)pleasant states, we only
talk about their non-affective differences—we point to the difference between sensory and
mental, or between distinct sense modalities, or concerning location and complexity, and so
on. This is exactly what our theory predicts.
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7. But how? And why?
First-order imperativism proposes that an experience has affective
phenomenal character in virtue of having first-order imperative con-
tent. Higher-order imperativism says that affective phenomenal char-
acter depends on the co-occurrence of two distinct mental states, one
of them being a higher-order Command. Both views, we argued, face
significant problems. We showed that all these problems can be solved
at once by hypothesising that an experience has affective phenomenal
character in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a
Command with reflexive imperative content. This was, in a nutshell,
our argument for reflexive imperativism.
Despite its explanatory virtues, there are two families of worries that
our view is bound to attract. The first concerns its underlying meta-
physics; the second has to do with the place of reflexive imperative
content in the natural world. We consider them in turn.
7.1 Get it together!
You are feeling an unpleasant pain in your right foot. Both reflexive
and higher-order imperativism say that you are tokening a first-order
sensory experience and a Command. However, while Klein interprets
the ‘and’ roughly as ‘at the same time as’ (so that your unpleasant pain
consists of two co-occurring, but numerically distinct, mental states),
we read it as ‘conjoined with’: your unpleasant pain is a single, but
composite, mental state.
The semantic implications of this distinction are clear. Whereas Klein’s
view posits that the content of the Command is to get more/less of a state
that is distinct from itself, according to our theory the Command tells
one to get more/less of the experience of which it is a part, thereby
targeting itself. And this is why our theory answers our third overarching
question in a way that neither formulation of Klein’s can:
(Q3) In virtue of what does affective phenomenal character have
intrinsic and reflexive motivational force?
According to (HO1), it is the Command that has affective phenomenal
character. In that case, the motivational force of affective phenomenal
character is not reflexive—it motivates one to get more/less of a state
that is different from the one that is pleasant/unpleasant. According to
(HO2), it is the sensory state targeted by the Command that has af-
fective phenomenal character. In this case, the motivational force of
affective phenomenal character is not intrinsic to the affective
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experience—it depends entirely on a separate conative state, namely,
an affectless Command. By contrast, if the affective phenomenal char-
acter of an experience E depends, as we argue, on E’s being (at least
partly) constituted by a reflexive Command, then affective phenom-
enal character can be both reflexive (it motivates one for/against E)
and intrinsic to E (it does not depend on any conative state other than
E itself ).
This invites the following question: what is the difference between
there being one single, complex state of this type, rather than two
distinct, but co-occurring, simpler mental states? Since cognitive sys-
tems can be described at different levels, there is more than one way to
address this question. For reasons of space, we confine ourselves to
discussion of it at the syntactic level (Pylyshyn 1984).
What is the difference between, on the one hand, believing that the
sun is shining and believing that the sky is blue, and, on the other
hand, believing that: the sun is shining and the sky is blue? In the first
case, one is tokening two distinct mental representations in one’s
mind (say, #SUN-SHINE# and #SKY-BLUE#), while in the second
case one is tokening a single, but more complex, mental representa-
tion (#SUN-SHINE & SKY-BLUE#). This is not loose talk. We take
something along these lines to be literally true of human minds, as
something along these lines is literally true of computers. In fact,
something along these lines, we claim, not only is literally true of
beliefs, desires, and the like, but of experiences as well, including af-
fective experiences.
Accordingly, one way to articulate the disagreement between reflex-
ive and higher-order imperativism is as follows: while the latter main-
tains that to have, say, an unpleasant pain is just to token two distinct
mental representations at the same time, reflexive imperativism pro-
poses that unpleasant pain is constituted by a single, complex, con-
junctive representation with the syntactic form #F & K-#—where, as
we have indicated, #K-# is a reflexive Command and #F# a first-order
Indicator.
A difficulty still stands in the way. In order for you to believe that
the sun is shining and the sky is blue, your mind needs to conjoin two
mental representations of the same type—your mind has to put to-
gether two beliefs to generate another belief. However, according to
our view, for you to feel an unpleasant pain, your mind has to conjoin
two different types of representation, namely, a Command and an
Indicator. How do we know that this is possible?15 Three quick and
interconnected answers.
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First, we follow our explanation where it leads. If the best account of
affective experiences and their phenomenal character commits us to
mixed indicative-imperative conjoined representations, then that is a
commitment we are happy to make. In the absence of a demonstration
that such representations are not possible, the explanatory power we
gain justifies the commitment.
Second, these mixed representations do appear to be possible in a
functionalist framework. An Indicator has the function of representing
how things are; thus it will be consumed by the belief system. A
Command is poised to make an impact on one’s motivational
system. Accordingly, a mixed indicative-imperative representation is
such that, all else being equal, it will have an impact on both one’s
beliefs and one’s motivations. This is why, as a result of tokening an
unpleasant pain, one typically ends up believing that there is some-
thing going wrong in one’s body and being motivated to get rid of the
unpleasant experience.
Our third and final point is that similar mixed representations have
already been introduced in the philosophical and psychological litera-
ture. Even leaving aside Millikan’s (1995) pushmi-pullyu representa-
tions, a prominent view in the cognitive science of emotions is that the
latter are complex states made up of a variety of indicative represen-
tations (appraisals, bodily perceptions, and so on) and a variety of
imperative representations (motor commands, action tendencies, and
so on) all bound together in a single, complex mental representation.
(See Seth and Friston 2016 for a review.) In fact, we are not the first
imperativists to have proposed the existence of mixed indicative-im-
perative representations. As we have seen in §4, Martı´nez’s first-order
imperativism proposes that prototypical affective experiences are
compound mental states made up of an Indicator conjoined with a
Command. The fundamental difference, of course, is that, contra
Martı´nez, we argue that the Command has reflexive imperative con-
tent. Maybe, it is here where the real difficulty lies. Maybe, there is
something particularly problematic about such reflexive Commands.
It is to this issue that we now turn.
7.2 Reflexive imperative content naturalised
Recall that one of the attractive features of intentionalism is that it
paves the way to naturalising phenomenal character. However, one
might think that by attempting to explain affective phenomenal
15 We thank the Editors of Mind for pressing us on this point.
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character in terms of reflexive imperative content we have traded one
mystery for another. From a naturalistic point view, reflexive impera-
tive content might appear just as puzzling as phenomenal character.
‘How can a mental representation have such a content?’, we hear you
asking.
Since this is a ‘how-possibly ’ question, we give a ‘how-possibly ’
answer. That is, we show that there are no obstacles in principle to
a naturalistic psychosemantics for reflexive imperative content. To do
this, we sketch a toy teleo-semantics. Importantly, we are not com-
mitted to it, or to teleo-semantics more generally. In fact, we intend
our theory of affective phenomenal character to be as neutral about
content-determination as possible. Our aim here is just to show that
there is nothing mysterious or spooky about reflexive Commands.
Here is a teleo-semantics for imperative content in general:
Command K has imperative content C if and only if K has the bio-
logical function of making it the case that C. The passage to reflexive
imperative content is straightforward: Command K- has the content
Less of the experience of which K- is a constitutive part! if and only if K-
has the biological function of producing less of the experience of
which it is a constitutive part. The same applies, mutatis mutandis,
to ‘positive’ reflexive imperative content.
This gives rise to a further question: why is there something with no
function except to get more or less of itself (better, of the state of
which it is a constituent)? What is the evolutionary advantage of
reflexive Commands? Since we maintain that affective phenomenal
character depends on these Commands, an answer to that question
will also be an answer to the following question: what is the evolu-
tionary advantage of affective phenomenal character? Or, if you prefer,
why do we need experiences that feel good or bad? Couldn’t nature
just have endowed us with representations, desires, and affectless first-
order imperatives like the urge to defecate? Why did we need to suffer?
These are deep problems, and we shall not answer in detail here—not
just because there is not enough space, but also because nobody knows
the exact details. Still, we can tell you a nice story.
Once upon a time, planet Earth was populated with quite simple-
minded creatures—spiders, scorpions, flies, snails, and so on. Each of
them faced the following formidable tasks: get food, avoid predators,
reproduce, and so forth. Still, given the relative non-flexibility of their
behaviours, we might suppose that they performed these tasks in the
absence of complex decision-making activities. Presumably, they
could get by on the basis of a more or less fixed set of pre-
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programmed responses. These responses were more useful the more
specific they were. Otherwise, they would have offered the organism
little guidance.
As more complex creatures came into being, such specific responses
ceased to be sufficient. Complex creatures had a greater number of
goals than their simpler kin. They also had far more varied means at
their disposal for achieving them. This gave them a vast array of sub-
goals. And in many cases even basic goals had become so complex as
to make it impossible to pre-program these creatures with instructions
for dealing with the manifold challenges they faced. For example, their
bodies were now capable of undergoing a nearly endless variety of
damage, each calling for quite different courses of action in order to
promote recovery. These creatures thus needed the capacity to learn
what the best means to achieve a certain goal are. This is when affect-
ive phenomenal character (or, which comes to the same thing, reflex-
ive Commands) kicked in.16
Affective phenomenal character works as a system of reward and
punishment. A complex creature, call it ‘CC’, is in a certain predica-
ment—say, its body has been damaged, or it is looking for a mate. CC
does not possess in advance a solution to these problems: it has not
been hardwired with a comprehensive set of instructions for how to
fix the damage, or for how to perform courtship behaviour. It is up to
its thinking brain to work out what to do. CC needs to learn. This
often takes trial and error.
CC has injured its ankle. It starts by trying to use the leg normally—
ouch! An unpleasant experience obtains. It acts as a punishment. Its
unpleasantness commands: Less of this experience! CC has learned that
this is not the right way to go and looks for another strategy. It
experiments with changing its gait as it walks, and adopts whichever
solution brings about least unpleasantness. Over time it learns more
sophisticated behaviours. It realises that sleeping in a certain position
decreases unpleasantness in the morning, and accordingly does that,
16 Our theory thus ascribes experiences with affective phenomenal character only to crea-
tures of relative cognitive complexity. This seems to generate a problem. Surely human infants
can experience at least some affective experiences. But aren’t they too cognitively unsophisti-
cated to token mental states with reflexive imperative content? Quite the contrary. A large
body of evidence indicates that the capacity to represent others’ mental states is functional in
human infants as young as 6 or 8 months. (See Carruthers 2013 for a review.) Since the meta-
representations involved in mental states attributions are more complex than the kind of
reflexive content we have introduced to explain affective phenomenal character, we maintain
that there is nothing implausible in the claim that human infants can token reflexive
Commands from the very beginning.
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or that applying ice to the site of the injury makes things feel better.
When, in the future, it has another injury of this apparent type, CC
may re-enact the successful strategy and, if the injury is indeed similar,
it will likely be successful again. If the injury is not similar, a new
learning process will begin.
Now CC needs a mate. It tries a strategy to attract one. This one
doesn’t work—so it tries something else. Hopefully, CC will eventually
do the right thing. Bingo! It gets lucky, and CC is rewarded with a
pleasant experience. The pleasant experience commands: More of me!
CC will then re-enact the successful strategy in the future and, all else
being equal, it will be successful again. If all else is not equal, a new
learning process will begin.
CC has learned complex strategies for dealing with difficult predica-
ments, guided by pleasantness and unpleasantness. It is for these ‘two
sovereign masters … alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as
to determine what we shall do’ (Bentham, 1789/1970, p. 11).
You might still be unconvinced. CC has twisted an ankle, and does
not know how to take care of this. When CC puts weight on the ankle,
it experiences an unpleasant pain U. In this way, CC learns not to
behave like that. Isn’t it thus natural to say that the function of U’s
unpleasantness is that of preventing CC from putting weight on the
ankle? Accordingly, given that in teleo-semantics content is fixed by
function, should we not conclude that U’s unpleasantness depends on
the first-order content Don’t put weight on your ankle! rather than on a
reflexive content? We should not.
As soon as we consider how many affective experiences there are, it
becomes obvious that there is no one world-directed behaviour that
affective phenomenal character has the function to produce. Even in
such a simple case as the unpleasant injured ankle, there is a vast array
of appropriate behaviours that CC is liable to adopt. Thus even
though there is no doubt that affective phenomenal character often
(but not always, see §4.2) brings about one or another world-directed
behaviour, the causal relation between the two cannot be explained in
terms of first-order imperative content (unless one wanted to cash out
affective phenomenal character in terms of a very, very long disjunc-
tion of first-order contents—and, trust us, you do not want that!).
The right thing to say is instead that an experience’s affective phe-
nomenal character tells you More/Less of this experience! and leaves to
you the task of figuring out which behaviour, if any, can satisfy this
request. Sometimes, this process leads to a world-directed behaviour.
After all, getting rid of a cavity is a good way of getting rid of an
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unpleasant toothache. At other times, this process engenders a mind-
directed behaviour, like taking a painkiller. In fact, any behaviour
might arise, insofar as it culminates in getting more/less of your af-
fective experience. This is the only thing affective phenomenal char-
acter cares about. It is a very self-centred character indeed.17
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